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CHURCH AND STATE: COOPERATIVE SEPARATISMt 
Paul G. Kauper* 
NOTHING is better calculated to stimulate argument, arouse con-troversy, excite the emotions and even produce intense visceral 
reactions than a discussion of church-state relations. Always a 
subject of lively interest, it has received added attention and em-
phasis in recent months. Perhaps at no time in at least the modem 
era of American history have the questions of the proper relation-
ship between religion and government been more thoroughly pub-
licized and explored, and the issues more widely debated, than 
during the period beginning with the presidential campaign of 
1960. 
The nomination by the Democratic Party of a Catholic, John 
F. Kennedy, for the Presidency sparked the new public discussion 
of church-state relations and, more particularly, the question 
whether an adherent of the Catholic faith could properly discharge 
the functions of the President of the United States. Opposition to 
election of a Catholic to the Presidency was based on the premise 
that the Catholic Church does not recognize the traditional Amer-
ican separation doctrine and that, therefore, a Catholic president 
could not be expected, out of loyalty to his faith and his church, to 
act in conformity with this doctrine. In response to these charges, 
Mr. Kennedy took a clear and unequivocal position in support of 
the separation of church and state. 
Whether Mr. Kennedy's Catholic religion helped or hurt in 
the course of the campaign is one· of those debatable matters on 
which judgment may be withheld. What is important for the pur-
pose of this discussion is that Mr. Kennedy won the election and 
thereby became the first Catholic to win and occupy the nation's 
t This article is based on a lecture delivered on June 27, 1961, as one of a series of 
lectures on "The Constitution of the United States-1961," given in connection with the 
Second Special Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law 
School, Ann Arbor. The entire series of lectures will be published in book form in the 
Spring of 1962 by The University of Michigan Press.-Ed. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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highest office. His election may be viewed as marking a decisive 
step in the history of religion in the United States. It effectively 
symbolized shifts in status of the nation's religious forces. It is fair 
to say that from the time of the early settlements until recent dec-
ades, Protestantism has been the dominant religious force in help-
ing to shape the pattern of American life and the content of Amer-
ican culture. But the growth in size, power, and influence of the 
Catholic and Jewish minorities has pointed up a significant new 
pattern of American religious pluralism which marks the end of 
the so-called Protestant era in American history. This, in turn, has 
a vital bearing on all problems of church-state relations. The rec-
ognition that the Catholic and the Jewish groups, as the other two 
primary religious groups in this country, along with the Protestant 
groups all stand in an equal position, that none has a preferred po-
sition either in determining governmental policy or choice of 
officers, or in molding the religious mores of the country, has a 
significance that far transcends the election of a Catholic as Presi-
dent of the United States. 
It became apparent some years ago that as the influence of the 
Catholic and Jewish constituencies increased, traditional Protes-
tant assumptions would have to be discarded. Now here were these 
assumptions more clearly articulated and expressed than in the 
field of education. The public school system as it first developed 
and, indeed, as it has continued in some parts of the country to 
this day, was essentially a Protestant school system, and it is not 
surprising that despite the Protestant emphasis on separation of 
church and state, the reading of the King James version of the 
Bible as a devotional exercise was not uncommonly an accepted 
part of the public school program. On the other hand, the idea 
that no public funds should go to support competing schools, not-
ably parochial or religious schools, is another distinctive aspect of 
Protestant thinking. 
The current interest in church-state questions has been gener-
ated not only by the discussions of the religious issue in the course 
of the presidential campaign of 1960, but also by concrete legisla-
tive proposals that have a direct bearing on the problem. The 
President's proposal for federal aid to education, whereby federal 
funds will be used to subsidize either capital expenditures or operat-
ing expenses, or both, of public schools throughout the nation,1 
1 President's Message to Congress, 107 CONG. REc. 2284 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1961) • 
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immediatedly provoked the question whether some federal aid 
should not be extended also to non-public schools including the 
parochial schools operated by church bodies. The Catholic hier-
archy, supported by some other groups, including a national organ- . 
ization of Orthodox Jews, is pushing a proposal that the federal 
government at least make low-rate interest loans available to non-
public schools to assist in the construction of badly needed facili-
ties.2 The President has ventured the opinion that any kind of 
assistance like this to church-operated schools would be unconstitu-
tional.3 On the other hand, the President's aid-to-education pro-
gram, while denying subsidies to non-public schools at the primary 
and secondary level, encompasses proposals for federal subsidies in 
the field of higher education, including loans or grants to church-
related colleges for capital purposes, tuition grants to students 
attending these colleges and further payments to these colleges, 
which raise similar constitutional issues. 
Decisions by the Supreme Court during the past term add fur-
ther interest to discussion of these problems. A Maryland law 
requiring that a person seeking an appointment as notary public 
take an oath declaring his belief in God has been held unconsti-
tutional.4' Much more significant, however, were the decisions 
dealing with the validity of Sunday closing laws.5 The opinions 
in the cases, which will be discussed at some length later, furnish 
much interesting reading on the separation issue. 
Enough has been said to indicate that the problems of church-
state relations are with us in a very real and intimate way. A 
number of groups and organizations are devoting new study to 
these questions in order to clarify their position. While to some 
it may seem that the term "separation of church and state" solves 
all these questions, it has become clear to the more thoughtful 
observer that the relationship between the political and the reli-
gious forces of the community, all operating within the same social 
structure, and often serving concurrent or overlapping purposes, 
and drawing upon the same basic human resources and personnel, 
is a matter too complex to be described by use of slogans or sym-
2 See N.Y. Times, March 3, 1961, p. l; id., March 15, 1961, pp. I, 26; id., March 30, 
1961, p. 16. [All references herein to the New York Times are to the City Edition.] 
s See N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 22; id., March 9, 1961, pp. I, 16. 
4 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
5 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, 
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 
366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
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bols, and that the problems attending this relationship are too 
difficult to be solved by doctrinaire propositions or absolutes. 
I 
"Separation of church and state" is the symbolic language so 
often used as a beginning point of discussion. Actually this precise 
language does not have much relevancy to the American scene. It 
is borrowed from European history and tradition where the prob-
lem could be identified in terms of a single church and of a single 
state, or in later years of a single state and two churches, namely, 
Catholic and Protestant. To speak of separation of church and 
state in the United States invites some difficulty in the use of terms, 
first, because we have a plurality of states including the federal 
government and the individual states and, second, because we have 
a plurality of church bodies. Perhaps it would be more illuminat-
ing to identify the subject in terms of the problems arising out of 
the interrelationship of religious and political forces in the com-
munity. This interrelationship creates the problem in which we 
are interested. Use of the term "state" denotes the politically-
organized community with its monopoly of coercive power. The 
church, on the other hand, is a voluntary association which must 
depend on noncoercive religious motivation and persuasion in mak-
ing its impact upon the individual and the community. 
The problems we are concerned with have a substantial legal 
significance since both the Constitution of the United States and 
the constitutions of the several states include provisions that deal 
with the church-state problem. The first amendment to the Con-
stitution provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
Many of our state constitutions have provisions more explicit than 
this and are designed, in many cases, to make clear that public 
property and public money shall not be used for religious or sec-
tarian purposes or in aid of sectarian education.6 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has said that the provisions of 
the first amendment are made applicable to the states through the 
fourteenth amendment's due process clause,7 so that as a matter of 
federal constitutional restriction, and in addition to or apart from 
the limitations imposed by its own constitution, each state must 
6 E.g., M1cH. CoNST. art. II, § 3. 
7 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). 
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observe the limitation that it can make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
The first amendment says nothing explicitly about separation 
of church and state. This term is not used in the federal constitu-
tion and, indeed, it is not used in American constitutions generally. 
This phrase is one of the verbal symbols that is useful as a short-
hand term for conveying a set of related ideas, but it is useful to 
recognize that it is not a legal term, and certainly not a definitive 
constitutional term. What the first amendment does say is that 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Two different although 
related ideas are expressed in this opening clause of the first 
amendment. Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, and Congress shall make no law prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion. Ordinarily when people think of religious 
freedom they are thinking of the kind of freedom protected by this 
second part of the opening language of the first amendment, 
namely, that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religion. Freedom to exercise one's religion is, indeed, a 
fundamental right protected under the Constitution through the 
first amendment against Congress and under the due process clause 
against the states. It embraces freedom of worship, freedom in the 
organization of religious associations, freedom in the propagation 
of the faith, freedom in the distribution of religious literature, 
freedom in the enjoyment of public facilities dedicated to the dis-
semination and propagation of ideas, freedom from discrimination 
on religious grounds in the enjoyment of rights and privileges. 
This encompasses a wide field.8 
It is not so clear, at least on first blush, that the non-establish-
ment clause of the first amendment states a fundamental right in 
and of itself. The non-establishment idea, whatever it may mean 
in substance, becomes significant as a matter of fundamental right, 
only as the power of the states is used to force religion on a person, 
either by requiring his adherence to state-imposed religious beliefs 
or practices or by forcing him to submit to laws that have a reli-
gious purpose or to pay taxes in support of religious activities. The 
non-establishment idea acquires significance as a fundamental right 
only as a freedom from involuntary acceptance of or support of 
s See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 
lll9 U.S. 105 (1943); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) • 
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religion, but even in this situation, before a person can raise this 
issue in terms of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, he must show that any law or practice which he claims to be 
an invalid establishment of religion impinges in a substantial way 
upon either his personal freedom or his pocketbook. 
The question may be raised whether the free exercise of reli-
gion is dependent on the non-establishment of religion and the 
separation of church and state. If, for instance, there is an estab-
lished church, as in England, is this incompatible with the free 
exercise of religion? Some would say not and point to England as 
an example. The Anglican Church is the established Church of 
England. But is there not complete freedom of religion in Eng-
land? All nonconformist and dissenting religious groups are free to 
pursue their own ways and no one's faith is coerced. But, this is 
not quite the case. The clergy and members of the Church of Eng-
land are really not free to exercise their own religion since control 
of the Church is technically in the hands of Parliament. No estab-
lished church subject to governmental control or dependent upon 
governmental support is really completely free. Moreover, mem-
bers of independent churches are not as completely free to propagan-
dize their beliefs in the market-place of ideas if they are competing 
with a religion enjoying a preferred status established and sup-
ported by law. Non-establishment as a rule requiring neutrality as 
between religions is then an important facet of the central concept 
of religious freedom. On the other hand, if non-establishment 
means that government must be completely indifferent to religion 
and that it can do nothing which aids religion in any way, even 
though not preferential or discriminatory, the relationship of non-
establishment as thus defined to the free exercise of religion be-
comes a more complicated matter. If the government without dic-
tating or coercing belief on any one's part recognizes the place of 
religion in the life of the community, and, without preferring one 
or more religious groups, accommodates its program and the use 
of its facilities to religious needs and supports activities in which 
the government and the churches have a concurrent interest and 
common concern, religious freedom is not placed in jeopardy. On 
the contrary, it may be argued that the government is thereby 
contributing to religious freedom and making it more meaning-
ful. Some situations may arise when a choice must even be made 
between the non-establishment principle as broadly conceived and 
the principle that the government may not discriminate on reli-
gious grounds. 
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As previously noted, the Constitution does not employ the 
term "separation of church and state," much less the terms "wall 
of separation" or "complete and permanent separation of church 
and state." These are all phrases that have been coined outside the 
constitutional language. The Supreme Court has said that the 
twin phrases of the first amendment, proscribing laws respect-
ing an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, combine to require a separation of church and state.9 
It is evident, then, that the critical problems in respect to the 
separation of church and state turn on the interpretation given to 
the first phrase of the opening clause of the first amendment, 
namely, that Congress and, as interpreted, the states, shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion. 
II 
We turn, then, to the interpretation given this language by 
the Supreme Court in recent years, and for this purpose we shall 
take account of key statements found in important cases. The first 
occurred in the course of the majority opinion in the well-known 
and now famous case of Everson v. Board of Education10 where the 
Court held constitutional a local school board's action in providing 
bus transportation at the expense of public tax funds for children 
attending parochial as well as public schools. This was the specific 
problem before the Court, and the majority found nothing uncon-
stitutional about the school board's action. It is evident, therefore, 
that anything the Court said in that case about what either Con-
gress or the states may not do to aid religion was dictum. The 
principal paragraph of Mr. Justice Black's much-quoted dictum in 
this case reads as follows: 
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go 
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him 
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can 
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in 
9 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 
312 (1952). 
10 330 U.S. I (1947). 
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any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, 
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations 
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 
'a wall of separation between church and State ... .' "11 
It will be noted that the Court in this broad dictum, purport-
ing to interpret the non-establishment clause, included some ideas 
that clearly come under the free exercise of religion concept. Any 
attempt by government to force or influence a person to remain 
away from church or to profess a disbelief in any religion or to 
punish him for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or for 
church attendance would be a clear violation of religious freedom. 
What appears in this dictum as distinctively an interpretation of 
the non-establishment idea is that the government cannot set up a 
church, pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer 
one religion over another, force or influence a person to go to 
church, force him to profess a belief in religion, punish him for 
disbelief or non-attendance at church, levy a tax to support any 
religious activities or institutions that teach or practice religion, or 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups. 
In short non-establishment means that the government can do 
nothing to sanction or aid religion. Translated in terms of the 
right of the individual, this means that a person enjoys a constitu-
tional right to be free from any governmentally-sanctioned religion 
and free from any imposition by way of taxes to support religion. 
Finally, it should be noted that Mr. Justice Black concludes this 
part of his opinion by referring to Jefferson's famous statement 
that the Constitution is intended to erect "a wall of separation 
between church and state.'' 
That non-establishment should mean that the government may 
not sanction a particular religion or establishment or force religion 
on anyone is understandable. Such a construction promotes both 
the freedom of the believer and_ the freedom of the unbeliever, and 
both are entitled to constitutional protection. On this basis the 
Court this past term held invalid the provision of the Maryland 
Constitution requiring a declaration of belief in God as a condi-
11 Id. at 15-16. 
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tion of holding public office.12 It is clear also that the conscience 
of individuals should not be coerced by forcing them to pay tax.es 
in support of a religious establishment or religious activities. But 
the statement in Mr. Justice Black's dictum in Everson that gov-
ernment cannot aid all religions presents more difficulty. Did 
this mean that the government could under no circumstances do 
anything to recognize and encourage the worth of religious activi-
ties? If this is what was meant, then was this intended by the lan-
guage used in the first amendment? Scholars disagree on this.13 
Moreover, practices long sanctioned in American history cast doubt 
on the validity of this interpretation: tax exemptions for property 
used for religious purposes, commissioning of chaplains for the 
armed services, religious services in the nation's military schools, 
use of public property such as sidewalks and parks for religious 
purposes, exemptions of conscientious objectors from military serv-
ice, tax deductibility of contributions for religious purposes, and 
the preferred treatment under the income tax laws for housing 
allowances for ministers. Surely there is aid to religion in one way 
or another in all these practices. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Black 
recognized in his Everson dictum, no one questions the validity of 
giving churches the benefit of the usual governmental services such 
as police and fire protection and water service. 
It is clear, then, that either the Court was painting with too 
broad a brush in condemning all aid to religion or was using the 
term in a special way that needed further clarification. In the end 
did Mr. Justice Black say anything more than that the Constitution 
forbids the kind of aid which amounts to an establishment of reli-
gion? The difficulty in the "aid to religion" concept is manifest 
in the dissenting opinion in the Everson case. The four dissenting 
Justices apparently accepted everything that Mr. Justice Black said 
about the meaning of non-establishment but felt that the majority 
had made a wrongful application of the idea since, in their opin-
ion, the use of public monies to send children to parochial as well 
as to public schools was an aid to the teaching of religion which 
according to the majority thesis was forbidden by the Constitution. 
This, of course, illustrates at once the problem of interpretation 
and suggests also that a proposal to use federal funds to grant some 
12 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
13 See 1 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 537.39 (1950); Pfeffer, 
Church and State: Something Less Than Separation, 19 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 1 (1951) ; Katz, 
Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953). 
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kind of assistance to parochial schools cannot be summarily dis-
posed of by saying that it is constitutionally forbidden in view of 
the dictum in the Everson case. Indeed, if the actual holding in 
Everson means anything, it points in the opposite direction. 
The decisions that immediately followed Everson dealt with 
the released-time problem. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board 
of Education14 the majority held invalid a released-time arrange-
ment whereby public school property was used for the teaching of 
religion by teachers supplied by the primary religious groups, but 
at the expense of one hour per week of school time. Participation 
in the program was voluntary, and children whose parents objected 
to participation were assigned other school activities during this 
period. The majority of the Court considered the released-time 
program to be an unlawful involvement by the public school sys-
tem in a program of religious education. As the majority saw it, 
the churches were using the schools as a means of recruiting stu-
dents for religious education classes under circumstances that re-
sulted in coercion of students to attend. But here again we have 
a dissenting view, this time by Mr. Justice Reed, who felt that the 
majority were running the separation argument into the ground, 
and in support of this he pointed to many instances in American 
history where the state had taken a sympathetic view with respect 
to education for religious purposes. 
Broadly interpreted, McCollum could have meant that the sep-
aration principle derived from the non-establishment limitation 
requires the state to be completely indifferent to religion and to 
the interest of parents in religious education. This is the only 
actual decision by the Supreme Court where the holding can be said 
to rest on a broad theory of separation of church and state. Actu-
ally the case could easily be interpreted more narrowly to mean 
that the state may not make itself a party to any scheme whereby 
religious education is forced on children in the public schools. A 
broad interpretation of the case was repudiated by the later deci-
sion in Zorach v. Clauson15 where the Court sharply limited Mc-
Collum by its holding that a program of released time for religious 
education of children in the public schools was constitutional pro-
vided that the classes were not conducted on the school premises. 
For all practical purposes a majority of the Court had now swung 
14 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
15 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
1961] CHURCH AND STATE 11 
around to the views expressed by Mr. Justice Reed in dissent in 
the McCollum case. This becomes evident when we look more 
closely at Mr. Justice Douglas's majority opinion and also at the 
opinions written for the four dissenting Justices who argued strenu-
ously that the distinction between this case and the McCollum case 
was insubstantial and even trivial and did not warrant a difference 
in result. The dissenters appear to be right in saying that there was 
no substantial distinction between the two cases. What is far more 
important was Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion in Zorach. Speaking 
for a majority of the Court he sharply limited the language previ-
ously used in the Everson case. Indeed, in view of the fact that 
Zorach is a later case, it is surprising that in so much of the cur-
rent discussion of church-state problems in their constitutional 
aspects, the fashion is to quote the Everson opinion even though 
it was substantially weakened by what Mr. Justice Douglas said in 
Zorach. In the course of his opinion Mr. Justice Douglas said: 
" ... There is much talk of separation of Church and State 
in the history of the Bill of Rights and in the decisions clus-
tering around the First Amendment ... [here citing the Ever-
son andMcCollum cases]. There cannot be the slightest doubt 
that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church 
and State should be separated. And so far as interference 
with the 'free exercise' of religion and 'establishment' of reli-
gion are concerned, the separation must be complete and un-
equivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its 
coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. 
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every 
and in all respects there shall be a separation of Church and 
State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific 
ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or depend-
ency one on the other. That is the common sense of the mat-
ter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each 
other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches 
could not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipali-
ties would not be permitted to render police or fire protection 
to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into 
their places of worship would violate the Constitution .... 
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedoms to worship as 
one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs 
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We 
sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no 
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partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish accord-
ing to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. 
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates 
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public 
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. 
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and 
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To 
hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a 
requirement that the government show a callous indifference 
to religious groups. That would be preferring those who be-
lieve in no religion over those who do believe. Government 
may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious in-
struc,tion nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use 
secular institutions to force one or some religion on any per-
son. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes 
it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to 
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of 
religious influence. The government must be neutral when it 
comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any 
sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance 
compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to 
observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction. 
But it can close its doors or suspend its operations as to those 
who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or 
instruction. No more than that is undertaken here. 
"This program may be unwise and improvident from an 
educational or a community viewpoint. That appeal is made 
to us on the theory, previously advanced, that each case must 
be decided on the basis of 'our own prepossessions.' ... Our 
individual preferences, however, are not the constitutional 
standard. The constitutional standard is the separation of 
Church and State. The problem, like many problems in con-
stitutional law, is one of degree ... .''16 
Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion for the majority in the Zorach 
case is quoted at length since it reflects a basic difference in ap-
proach. To be sure, it overlaps in large part what was said in 
Everson. The government may not finance religious groups, must 
be neutral between sects, cannot undertake religious instruction or 
force religion, religious instruction or a religious observance on 
anyone. There are notable points of difference, however, and 
these points of difference become crucial and central in any dis-
16 Id. at 312-14. 
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cussion of the problem. First of all the Zorach opinion recognizes 
that the first amendment itself says nothing about the separation of 
church and state. Separation is not in itself a starting point in con-
stitutional thinking. It follows and is required only to the extent 
that it flows from the clauses relating to non-establishment and the 
free exercise of religion. The first amendment, then, according to 
Zorach, does not ordain a complete and absolute separation of 
church and state in every respect. Implicitly the Court in Zorach 
repudiates the notion that the first amendment establishes a wall 
of separation between church and state, for the wall terminology 
and imagery is based upon a notion of absolute and complete sepa-
ration. Moreover, in Zorach the Court emphasized the idea that 
the legislative body of a state may take into account the religious 
interests of its citizens and adapt its legislative program to that end 
at least so far as accommodation of public facilities and services is 
concerned. Here, in other words, is a disclaimer of the idea that 
the state must be completely neutral as between religion and non-
religion. At least so far as the first amendment is concerned the 
Court says that the legislature may take account of the religious 
interests of its people in its legislative program so long as it does 
not act with coercive effect upon dissenters and non-believers, and 
no preference is given to any one religious group. In short, the 
government is not required to act as though religion and religious 
institutions did not exist. It may go farther and find that they per-
form a useful and desirable function in the social community, even 
a public purpose, and that within the limits imposed by the Con-
stitution their activities may be encouraged and favored by the 
state. Finally, it is significant that the Court said in the Zorach 
case that the problem of separation of church and state, like many 
problems in constitutional law, is one of degree. Indeed, this may 
be the most significant statement in the whole case. The problems 
in this area cannot be solved by resort to doctrinaire absolutes, 
verbal formulae or metaphors. As in the case of all constitutional 
adjudication, the Court must look at these problems in terms of 
the competing interests at stake and, therefore, take a critical look 
both at what the state is trying to do and what are the fundamental 
purposes served by the constitutional restrictions. 
The most recent extended expressions of opinion in this im-
portant area are found in the Court's four decisions handed down 
at the last term dealing with the validity of Sunday closing laws, 
and any discussion of the problems in this area must take these 
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decisions and the several opinions into account. Indeed, the whole 
area of church-state relations and the basic meaning of the first 
amendment are subjected to intensive review. 
The basic constitutional problems presented in the four cases 
consolidated for hearing before the Court can be simply stated: 
(I) Is a state or local law, which states a general rule prohib-
iting work or business on Sundays, unconstitutional because it, in 
effect, is an attempt pro tanto to establish the Christian religion as 
the religion of the community? 
(2) Even if such a law is not generally invalid on an establish-
ment theory, must it as a constitutional matter exempt from its 
prohibition of Sunday work persons who because of religious con-
victions observe a day other than Sunday as a day of rest? 
The majority of the Court found these Sunday closing statutes 
to be constitutional, both in their general application and in their 
application to persons who for religious reasons observe another 
day of the week as a day of rest, as in the case of orthodox Jews who 
abstain from business activities on the Sabbath.17 The chief opin-
ions were ·written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and were concurred 
in by Justices Black, Clark and Whittaker. A long concurring 
opinion was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined by Mr. J us-
tice Harlan.18 Justices Brennan and Stewart concurred in the view 
that Sunday closing laws are not generally invalid as an attempt to 
establish the Christian religion, but dissented from the majority's 
holding on the second question, since in their opinion it is a viola-
tion of religious liberty to force a Sunday closing on a person who 
already for religious reasons observes a different closing day.19 Mr. 
Justice Douglas dissented both on the ground that Sunday closing 
laws are unconstitutional generally as an attempt to establish the 
Christian religion and on the further ground that they violate the 
religious freedom of persons who observe a different day of rest.20 
As already noted, these cases raised issues under both the non-
establishment and the free exercise clauses. The argument in re-
spect to establishment is easily seen, namely, that Sunday closing 
laws rest on the Christian conception of Sunday as a day of worship 
and rest, and that, therefore, these laws sanction the Christian 
17 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, 
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 
366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
18 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 459 (1961) (separate opinion). 
19 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609-10 (1961). 
20 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 561 (1961) (dissent). 
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religion as the official religion of the community. Admittedly, Sun-
day closing laws have their genesis in religious considerations. 
Eight members of the Court, however, are satisfied that the Sunday 
closing laws at issue in the cases before them, whatever the motiva-
tion behind their original enactment, are now justified on secular 
grounds as an exercise of the state's police power to promote the 
public health and welfare by establishing one day of the week as 
a day of rest, repose, relaxation, and family visiting. In short, the 
state has established a secular holiday for reasons appropriate to 
the state's police power, and the validity of its action is not im-
paired by the consideration that the day of the week chosen corre-
sponds with the day observed for religious reasons by a majority 
group in the community. Once it is conceded that the Sunday clos-
ing laws rest on adequate non-religious grounds, then, according 
to the majority, it is no violation of religious freedom to compel 
observance of the law by those persons who, because of their reli-
gion, feel compelled to observe a different day of the week as a day 
of rest and thereby must make a choice between their religion and 
the economic disadvantage of having to observe two days of rest each 
week. On this point the majority relied upon the well-established 
doctrine, supported by the cases, that the practice of religion is sub-
ject to the reasonable exercise of the police power. Polygamy may 
be prohibited even though sanctioned by religion;21 public health 
measures take precedence over religious scruples against medical 
treatment;22 and the public interest may require that a person serve 
in the country's armed forces even though he is a conscientious 
objector.23 Citing the practical enforcement problems that would 
otherwise arise and the difficulties involved in use of a religious 
test, the Court concluded that the legislature was not acting unrea-
sonably in denying exemptions from the Sunday closing law to 
persons whose religion required observance of a different day of 
rest. 
Although on the surface of the matter and by reference to the 
history of Sunday closing laws, one is tempted to support Mr. J us-
tice Douglas's view in dissent that no amount of rationalization can 
serve to disguise the religious motivation behind these laws, the 
lengthy opinions by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, together with the extended documentation, do lend 
21 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
22 See State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952). 
23 See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). 
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impressive support to the idea of evolution and change in the 
motivation underlying Sunday laws and to the thesis that for many 
Americans Sunday is a thoroughly enjoyable day of rest and relaxa-
tion quite unrelated to the matter of religious observance. The 
transformation of Sunday from a religious into a civil holiday is an 
interesting symbol of the secularization of American society. Reli-
gious forms are appropriated for secular purposes. 
What contribution do the Sunday closing law cases make to the 
interpretation of the non-establishment idea? The cases do not 
really turn on any new interpretation of establishment, since it was 
recognized by all nine Justices that Sunday closing laws would have 
to be condemned as an attempt to establish religion if they could 
be justified only by religious considerations. If the holding in these 
cases can be reduced to some capsule propositional form, it is that 
governmental action serving a valid public purpose by reference to 
civil and secular considerations does not become invalid because it 
operates simultaneously to promote religious interests, either gen-
erally or of a particular group. So stated, the holding is parallel to 
that of the Everson case-spending public money to send children 
by bus to parochial schools serves a valid secular purpose even 
though it also advances and helps a program of religious education. 
Although Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion24 discusses the 
general theory and interpretation of the first amendment at some 
length, in the end it relies chiefly on Everson as an exposition of 
the non-establishment language. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's sepa-
rate opinion is more instructive in this respect. He makes the 
principal point that the non-establishment idea forbids govern-
mental action which is directed toward the primary end of affirm-
ing or promoting religious doctrine. His opinion at this point is 
of sufficient interest to warrant the following extensive quotation: 
"Of course, the immediate object of the First Amend-
ment's prohibition was the established church as it had been 
known in England and in most of the Colonies. But with fore-
sight those who drafted and adopted the words: 'Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion,' did not 
limit the constitutional proscription to any particular, dated 
form of state-supported theological venture. The Establish-
ment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legisla-
tive concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, 
area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity 
24 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 422 (1961) • 
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of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of 
that belief or disbelief. Congress may not make these matters, 
as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any legislature 
in this country. Neither the National Government nor, under 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State, 
may, by any device, support belief or the expression of belief 
for its own sake, whether from conviction of the truth of that 
belief, or from conviction that by the propagation of that be-
lief the civil welfare of the state is served, or because a majority 
of its citizens, holding that belief, are offended when all do 
not hold it .... 
"To ask what interest, what objective, legislation serves, of 
course, is not to psychoanalyze its legislators, but to examine 
the necessary effects of what they have enacted. If the primary 
end achieved by a form of regulation is the affirmation or pro-
motion of religious doctrine-primary, in the sense that all 
secular ends which it purportedly serves are derivative from, 
not wholly independent of, the advancement of religion-the 
regulation is beyond the power of the state. This was the 
case in McCollum. Or if a statute furthers both secular and 
religious ends by means unnecessary to the effectuation of the 
secular ends alone-where the same secular ends could equally 
be attained by means which do not have consequences for 
promotion of religion-the statute cannot stand. A State may 
not endow a church although that church might inculcate in 
its parishioners moral concepts deemed to make them better 
citizens, because the very raison d'etre of a church, as opposed 
to any other school of civilly serviceable morals, is the predi-
cation of religious doctrine. However, inasmuch as indivi-
duals are free, if they will, to build their own churches and 
worship in them, the State may guard its people's safety by 
extending fire and police protection to the churches so built. 
It was on the reasoning that parents are also at liberty to send 
their children to parochial schools which meet the reasonable 
educational standards of the State, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, that this Court held in the Everson case that 
expenditure of public funds to assure that children attending 
every kind of school enjoy the relative security of buses, rather 
than being left to walk or hitchhike, is not an unconstitutional 
'establishment,' even though such an expenditure may cause 
some children to go to parochial schools who would not other-
wise have gone. The close division of the Court in Everson 
serves to show what nice questions are involved in applying to 
particular governmental action the proposition, undeniable in 
17 
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the abstract, that not every regulation some of whose practical 
effects may facilitate the observance of a religion by its adher-
ents affronts the requirement of church-state separation."25 
Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion serves a useful 
purpose in its analysis of the problem and with its emphasis on the 
"primary end" served by a regulation, the test proposed still re-
quires a large measure of judicial weighing and judgment. More-
over, his statement does not purport to explain or harmonize all 
the earlier cases. The McCollum case may very properly be cited 
to support the proposition that the state may not enact a form of 
regulation which has as its primary end the promotion of religious 
doctrine. But Mr. Justice Frankfurter says nothing about Zorach, 
and the question may indeed be raised whether Zorach can be 
fitted into his analysis. 
The weakness, if not futility, of attempts to state general propo-
sitions as controlling tests for these cases is further illustrated by 
Mr. Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion. The point of emphasis 
in his long and interesting opinion is captured in the following 
sentence:· "There is an 'establishment' of religion in the constitu-
tional sense if any practice of any religious group has the sanction 
of law behind it."26 
On the surface this sounds like a sensible and viable test. But, 
again, it may be questioned whether it states an accurate proposi-
tion. What if a law prohibiting polygamy exempts those who prac-
tice plural marriage as a matter of religious conviction? Or if a law 
regulating the slaughtering and inspection of meat exempts from 
its requirements meat slaughtered and inspected in accordance 
with religious practices? Similarly, what if a public health measure 
exempts persons who are opposed to medical treatment on religious 
grounds? Indeed, what if a Sunday closing law grants an exemption 
to persons who observe a different rest day on religious grounds? 
Can it not be said in each of these instances that the state is placing 
the sanction of law behind the practice of a religious group? Yet 
no one seriously supposes that any one of these exemptions would 
be held unconstitutional. On the contrary they would be appro-
priately regarded as a legislative recognition and implementation 
of religious freedom. 
25 366 U.S. 459, 465-67 (1961) (separate opinion). 
26 366 U.S. 561,576 (1961) (dissent). 
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III 
In the light of these expressions of opinion and the holdings by 
the Court, what can be said about the meaning of non-establish-
ment and what is its relevancy to today's most urgent problems in 
this area? 
In any critical examination of this general problem of church-
state relations and more particularly of the non-establishment limi-
tation, it is useful to start with the elementary idea that the state 
and the church serve basically different functions and objectives. 
It is the state's business to operate the politically-organized society 
and serve the community's civil needs. The business of the church 
is to minister to man's spiritual needs and to carry on activities 
appropriate to a sense of religious concern. Some may prefer not 
to put it in this way, but rather to say that the state is concerned 
with the secular functions of our society and the churches with its 
spiritual functions. This, too, may be a gross oversimplification, 
but it does, at least, point up a central consideration, namely, that 
church and state serve different primary functions. It is not the 
business of the state to operate a church or to engage in the propa-
gation of religious ideas. On the other hand, it is not the function 
of the churches to exercise the coercive authority of the politically-
organized community. This separation of function has its roots 
not simply in some theoretical conception of a convenient division 
of labor but is grounded more profoundly on the theory that the 
cause of human freedom is best served when religion and its insti-
tutions are grounded in voluntarism and not dependent upon 
political force. 
The really important questions we face today, however, do not 
arise from any threat of formal confusion of functions or any at-
tempt at formal institutional blending of the separate functions of 
the church and state. Rather they have to do with the practical 
problems of interrelationship involving questions of the recogni-
tion of each other's function and of the contribution that each 
makes to the total scheme of things. 
Even though a separateness of function is recognized in regard 
to the primary purposes of politically-organized society, on the one 
hand, and religious institutions, on the other, it is clear that this 
is an abstract idea which must be given practical meaning in the 
context of a social community where both the secular and religious 
societies draw upon the same human resources. This is what intro-
duces the perplexing aspects of our problem. We may speak of a 
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duality of citizenship-an allegiance to both the secular and the 
spiritual realms. Or to put it in terms of the language used by 
Luther in describing this situation we have the two kingdoms: the 
kingdom of the sword and the kingdom of the spirit. Yet they must 
necessarily operate within the same community. From this it 
follows that each must respect the other and, indeed, each is 
dependent upon the other. 
The state has a complete monopoly of coercive power with the 
result that the church is necessarily dependent upon the state for 
the maintenance of the elementary conditions of peace and order 
essential to the enjoyment of religious freedom and to the dis-
charge of the church's functions, whether it be the maintenance of 
a house of worship, propagation of the faith, teaching the young, 
or ministering to the sick and needy. It is an idea well accepted 
in Christian theology and doctrine that the state itself occupies an 
important role in God's created order and that its primary function 
in punishing the wrongdoer and preserving the peace of the com-
munity is to make possible the conditions that will advance the 
kingdom of the spirit. The church as the community of believers, 
therefore, respects the state and looks to the state for protection of 
the peace of the community, for protection of its property, and for 
enjoyment of the public services rendered by the state. Already at 
this point it becomes evident that there is an interdependence 
which is not accurately portrayed by the wall-of-separation meta-
phor. The church is dependent upon the state in a very real way 
in order to maintain its functions. For this reason the church deems 
it appropriate that its members support the state, pay taxes, vote, 
and serve as magistrates and civil servants despite the radical views 
of a small group within the Christian communion who, in order 
to carry separation to a maximum, have divorced themselves from 
the political life of the community. It is appropriately the function 
of the state to provide police and fire protection and to give 
churches the benefit of the same services provided to other organi-
zations and to individuals, whether it is in the furnishing of utility 
service or whatever service the politically-organized community 
renders. Obviously, the state in giving the religious community 
the benefit of these services is extending aid to religion in a very 
real sense. To suggest that this is distinguishable because this is 
not aid to religion as such is simply to use words to avoid the 
critical problem. When government makes its facilities available 
to protect the organized religious groups and to make possible the 
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system in which religion can flourish, it is giving the most impor-
tant aid that a state can give to any group with respect to the per-
formance of its functions. It is aid to religion but not the kind of 
aid forbidden by the Constitution. It is a benefit shared by the 
church with all the community, and the state in extending this 
benefit is not thereby using its power to promote or sanction 
religious belief. 
As the church is dependent on the state and depends for 
its effective functioning and even survival on valuable serv-
ices furnished by the state, so, in turn, the politically-organ-
ized community expects to be served by the religious community. 
The tradition developed in English legal history that the 
Chancellor was the keeper of the King's conscience. This term 
epitomized the idea that the King counted upon conceptions of 
equity developed by the Chancellor who was an ecclesiastical officer 
to liberalize the Common Law and to infuse it with moral con-
ceptions that had a basic religious orientation. This, in turn, is 
simply another manifestation of the idea that the churches in the 
discharge of their separate functions in cultivating the spiritual 
lives of their parishioners and in developing moral and ethical 
ideas founded on religious insight and motivation make an impor-
tant contribution to the politically-organized community. The 
state in formulating policy and in fashioning the law must depend 
upon the moral sense and values of the community. It makes little 
difference whether we recognize the church's contribution to the 
legal order and to the conception of public policy in terms of a 
body of moral or natural law which serves as a guide or norm for 
the framing of positive law or, whether apart from any conception 
of natural law, we identify this contribution to the civic order both 
through the impact of religiously-motivated citizens and public 
officers and the discharge by the church of a prophetic function in 
speaking to matters of public concern. In regard to such matters 
as disarmament, the use of nuclear weapons as war weapons, birth 
control, distribution of surplus food to needy peoples, immigration 
policy, aid to education, aid for the aged, the churches do have a 
real, vital interest. These are matters of both religious and civic 
concern. 
There are some who would suggest that separation of church 
and state means that religion and politics must be kept separate. 
If by this is meant that the church, in deference to the separation 
idea, may minister only to the spiritual needs of its members and 
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not exercise a prophetic function in speaking to the problems of 
our day, then we have a gross misconception of the separation prin-
ciple. Indeed, a higher principle arises here in terms of religious 
freedom on the part of any person or group to express ideas that 
have religious significance and which are relevant also to current 
social, economic and political problems. Criticism is often made 
of the Roman Catholic Church that it attempts to influence legis-
lative policy in such matters, for instance, as birth control, sterili-
zation, euthanasia, and obscenity in literature and the movies. On 
this matter it should be clear first of all that, in so far as this is a 
separation problem, it is not a constitutional problem since it is 
part of the freedom of churches to propagandize and to use their 
efforts to influence legislative policy. The Constitution does pro-
hibit giving to any church a formal place in the legislative process. 
But it does not prohibit the churches or their members from giv-
ing their opinions on matters of political concern or speaking ip 
support of legislative proposals. This, indeed, is part of their func-
tion as religious bodies. The idea that a man's religion is irrelevant 
to his conduct as a citizen or as a public officer states a low view of 
religion and a sterile concept of the place of religion in influ-
encing a man's conduct, attitudes and motivations. 
We may take as an illustrative case the problem of birth con-
trol. According to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, the use of 
means of artificial birth control presents a moral problem. Is it 
appropriate, then, for the church to advocate legislation designed 
to reflect the church's views on the subject, and, in turn, is legisla-
tion on this subject invalid as an establishment of religion? Legis-
lation in regard to moral matters has been common throughout 
our history. Indeed, religious and moral grounds may be cited to 
support a large body of our criminal laws. For many, murder is a 
crime because it violates religious commandments. We mention· 
this simply to indicate that legislation to advance and protect 
public morals has traditionally been regarded as one of the appro-
priate spheres of the police power. And if a substantial segment 
of a community, indeed, a dominant segment, wishes to translate 
a moral idea into a law, this is nothing new, nor does it violate 
any concept of separation of church and state in the constitutional 
sense. A dominant religious group may be ill-advised to do this 
and thereby impose its will upon others who do not accept, al-
though this is usually true of the exercise of the police power. In 
the end, these questions must be discussed and answered in the 
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course of the usual political and legislative processes. Although 
the Catholic Church has been singled out for the purpose of illus-
trating the question involved when a church presses for laws that 
reflect the church's views on moral questions, this situation is by 
no means peculiar to this church. President Grant reportedly said 
that there were three political parties in this country-the Repub-
licans, the Democrats and the Methodists.27 At present many 
church groups are identified with efforts to secure civil rights legis-
lation. Obviously, the separation idea does not preclude this. On 
the contrary, any sensible, mature, and sophisticated understand-
ing of the relationship between the church and the state must take 
account of these common areas of concern and recognize that ideas 
and values of religious significance may appropriately be translated 
into or identified with conceptions of public policy and interest 
within the proper reach of governmental power. 
There is, of course, an end point reached in the use of the 
legislative power to promote views, programs or practices that 
have a religious significance. A distinction must be made between 
legislation which finds support in considerations of public interest, 
even though also identifiable with religious views and practices 
and legislation designed to force a religious view or practice upon 
the community. The latter must be condemned as an unconstitu-
tional establishment of religion. Obviously a statute requiring 
every person to attend church on Sunday or to make a contribu-
tion in support of churches would be invalid. This is the use of 
the state's power to promote a strictly religious objective, and no 
secular or civil considerations can justify such legislation. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court, in the recent cases discussed ear-
lier, has held that Sunday closing laws are a valid exercise of the 
state's police power since they rest on adequate secular or civil 
considerations even though they may also serve the concurrent 
purpose of promoting observance of the Christian religion. 
Let us return for a moment to birth control laws. The Supreme 
Court at its last term handed down its decision dealing with the 
validity of the Connecticut statute prohibiting the use and sale of 
artificial birth control devices and the giving of medical advice 
with respect to their use. Although it is commonly supposed that 
the Catholic Church is responsible for this legislation, a study of 
its history indicates that its original enactment reflected Protestant 
27 See HESSELTINE, ULYSSES s. GRANT 305 (1935) • 
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morality of the Anthony Comstock era. The validity of this legis-
lation was argued before the Supreme Court wholly in terms of 
whether this was a valid exercise of the police power. Unfortu-
nately the outcome of the case was not decisive of the problem. A 
majority held that there was not a real case or controversy, since 
the statute was not being enforced, hence the constitutional issue 
was avoided.28 Two Justices believing that there was a case for the 
exercise of the judicial power found the statute invalid as an arbi-
trary restriction on individual liberty.29 The avoidance by the 
majority of the constitutional issue suggests that they did recog-
nize a substantial constitutional question presented by this kind of 
legislation. Two dissenters made clear that in their opinion there 
were no adequate considerations of public interest or policy to 
warrant this restriction on personal liberty. The notable dissent 
written by Mr. Justice Harlan stressed the argument that the 
statute in prohibiting use of contraceptives sanctioned a drastic 
invasion of the privacy of the home and of the marital relationship. 
Here, then, is the key to the general problem under consideration. 
Legislation identifiable with religious views and practices is con-
stitutional if it can be supported by adequate considerations of a 
secular or civil nature relevant to the exercise of governmental 
power. Otherwise it fails either as an attempt to establish religion 
or simply as an arbitrary exercise of power unrelated to appropri-
ate public objectives. 
In the situation just discussed, the problem is whether govern-
ment through the exercise of its police power is attempting to 
establish a religion, that is, whether by means of regulation of 
behavior compelling people to abstain from certain conduct it is 
sanctioning the views of a particular religion. The impact on per-
sonal liberty is evident in this case and the standing of a person 
affected by this to raise the question whether this is an attempt to 
establish religion is clear also. The more frequently arising ques-
tion in respect to the establishment of religion concerns the spend-
ing by a state of money or the use of public property for purposes 
28 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) • The chief opinion was written by Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter and joined by the Chief Justice and by Justices Clark and Whittaker. 
Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred in the determination 
that these cases presented no real and substantial controversy. Justices Douglas and Har• 
Ian dissented in separate opinions. Finding justiciable issues in the cases before them, 
and passing to the merits of the question, they concluded that the statute was unconsti• 
tutional. Justices Black and Stewart dissented on the dismissal of the case but did not 
express conclusions on the meritorious question. 
29 Justices Douglas and Harlan, id. at 509 and 522. 
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which are said to aid religion or to favor a religion and thereby to 
violate the establishment idea. These are probably the most press-
ing questions we face at the present time. Thus the question 
arises with respect to use of government funds for the purpose of 
aiding parochial schools in one way or another. . 
It should be noted that as soon as we get into questions with 
respect to the use of public funds, property or facilities in aid of 
religion, we also get into an important remedial and standing 
question. The remedial and standing question is, in turn, related 
to the meritorious question of underlying constitutional right, 
particularly when we are talking about the application of the four-
teenth amendment. No person can claim that he is being deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law by reference 
to allegedly unconstitutional use of state funds in support of or by 
way of establishment of religion unless he can demonstrate some 
substantial injury to life, liberty or property. If a special tax is 
levied in order to support a church establishment, this clearly gives 
the taxpayer standing by virtue of the financial imposition made 
upon him. Or if in connection with the use of funds to support 
religious education, where it is not clear that there is a substantial 
use of these funds or any out-of-pocket charges against the govern-
ment, the attempt is made to force this program on some unwilling 
person, it is clear here, too, that because of this invasion of his own 
freedom of conscience, he has standing to raise the question. But 
unless a person can demonstrate that alleged governmental par-
ticipation or involvement in or support of some program alleged 
to aid religion is a substantial diversion of tax funds and thereby 
burdens him as a taxpayer or otherwise infringes upon his own 
freedom, it is not clear that he has standing to raise these ques-
tions. 30 This point is particularly worth noting in respect to 
attempts to question the validity of spending by the federal gov-
ernment. In the well-known case of Frothingham v. Mellon31 the 
Supreme Court held that a federal taxpayer as such does not have 
standing to raise questions in respect to the validity of federal 
spending. This case was decided on the theory that a taxpayer has 
such a small and remote interest in funds in the federal treasury 
that he cannot claim any personal damage because funds derived 
from tax sources are being used in an unconstitutional way. We 
need not emphasize the importance of this idea in respect toques-
ao See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
31 Sub nom. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
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tions that may be raised with respect to the validity of federal 
spending for parochial schools, for instance. Even if we had a 
clear case of appropriation of funds by the federal government to 
aid religion or to aid religious education as religious education, it 
is not clear at this point just who could raise the question. If 
Frothingham v. Mellon were followed in this situation, taxpayers 
would not have standing. It may be that because of the importance 
of the first amendment restriction the Court will permit taxpayers 
to question any spending of money which is alleged to result in an 
establishment of religion. This remains to be seen. At this point 
it is enough to note that the standing problem presents substantial 
difficulties. 
In taking a closer look at the questions raised in regard to use 
of public funds, facilities, or property as a means of aiding religion 
and thereby constituting an unlawful establishment, several gen-
eral considerations may be noted at the outset. 
In the first place, notwithstanding what has been said by the 
Supreme Court, particularly in its dictum in the Everson case, the 
truth and the historical fact is that government funds have been 
spent distinctively in support of religious purposes. Although Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter said in his concurring opinion in the Sunday-
closing-law cases that government can never do anything that will 
support or endorse any religious view or views, history does not 
support so sweeping an assertion. The clearest case in refutation 
of this is the use of federal funds to pay salaries to officers in the 
armed forces who are military chaplains and who are commissioned 
as officers because they are religious officers and whose whole func-
tion is to perform a religious ministry to men in the armed services. 
Now we know that some special reasons are given for this situation, 
namely, that men in the armed forces are away from their usual 
homes and environment where they have the opportunity to attend 
church and so the government is meeting this need by supplying a 
chaplain service and this, in turn, is related to the government's 
interest in maintaining the morale and well-being of its soldiers. 
In other words, the government does have a proper and valid in-
terest here that warrants the expenditure of funds for this kind of 
religious ministry. Whatever the special reasons given, at least this 
demonstrates an important consideration, namely, that any abso-
lutes in respect to nonuse of public funds to aid religion simply 
do not fit the case. The problems in this area cannot be solved by 
painting with a broad brush that condemns all recognition of reli-
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gious purposes or assistance for religious purposes as being uncon-
stitutional. At present there is a movement in force in many of 
the states to supply chaplains at state institutions such as peniten-
tiaries, hospitals and the like. Again, no one seems seriously to 
question the validity of spending for this purpose even though it 
is distinctively in aid of a religious purpose. 
Similarly, no one can doubt that the granting of tax exemptions 
for property used for purposes of religion or religious education 
amounts to substantial financial assistance by the state to religious 
institutions. Again, rationalizations are provided to justify this sit-
uation, namely, that since exemption for church property is usually 
part of a statutory pattern whereby exemption is allowed for vari-
ous types of properties used for nonprofit purposes, therefore, 
it is appropriate to permit this exemption for property used for 
religious purposes, for otherwise there would be a discrimination 
against one class of property owned and operated by nonprofit 
institutions. This seems to be a tenable theory, but acquiescence 
in this theory should not obscure the fact that tax exemptions are 
generally recognized to be valid because the underlying institu-
tions serve a proper public purpose and in many instances they 
perform functions which otherwise the state would have to per-
form. This is not to suggest that the justification for tax exemp-
tions for churches is that they are performing a function which the 
state otherwise would perform, but rather that an exemption here 
is a recognition of the fact that religious institutions do serve a 
sufficiently public purpose to warrant this kind of treatment. 
A second consideration is that under some circumstances a state 
may have to make a choice between the principle that it cannot 
aid religion on the one hand and the competing principle that it 
cannot discriminate against religion. Perhaps this is already illus-
trated in the tax exemption case mentioned above, where it may 
be said that if tax exemptions are granted to all nonprofit institu-
tions, it would be an unwarranted discrimination to deny the ex-
emption to one particular class of nonprofit institutions, namely, 
churches and church-operated schools. Perhaps an even better 
illustration is found in the cases involving the use of public prop-
erties for purposes of religious meetings. The numerous cases 
involving Jehovah's Witnesses furnish an excellent illustration of 
this period. According to the Supreme Court's decisions there is 
a right to use public ways, including streets and sidewalks and 
public parks for purposes of religious meetings and demonstrations 
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as well as for other public meeting purposes. This is based on the 
theory in these cases of the free exercise of religion.32 It cannot be 
doubted that in these cases the state by making its facilities avail-
able-and it is told that it is under a constitutional duty to do so-
is aiding religion and is aiding the free exercise of religion. Yet 
not only is this permissible as a form of aid to religion, but it is 
even constitutionally required. 
Finally, I revert to an idea previously mentioned in connection 
with the police power cases, namely, that a concurrence of function 
may be found in some cases so far as the separate functions of both 
church and state are concerned. In the police power cases such as 
the Sunday closing laws, although it can be said the Christian 
church has a special interest in observance of Sunday, the state has 
a concurrent interest in having all people observe a day of rest and 
it may appropriately choose Sunday as the designated day for this 
purpose. Here we have a concurrence of religious and secular 
interest converging upon the same result. There may also be a 
concurrence of interest with respect to the performance of certain 
functions, where the question is properly raised whether, because 
of such concurrence of interest, a state may appropriately recognize 
and support certain undertakings carried on by the churches. It 
is useful to note in this connection that a notable aspect of the 
secularization of American life is the gradual taking over by the 
state of many functions at one time performed by the churches. 
We do recognize that it is appropriately a religious function to 
engage in activities other than having church services on Sunday. 
It is appropriately a church function to operate hospitals, to oper-
ate schools and colleges, and to take care of the needy and helpless. 
Yet we know also that in these areas the state has been moving in 
more and more, and that with the progressive acceptance of the 
conception of the welfare· state or the social service state, we are 
looking to government to perform functions which at one time 
were performed wholly or primarily by the churches. The fact 
that the state is now performing these functions in no way impairs 
the validity of the churches' performance of these same functions. 
The question then arises whether, because of concurrence of 
interests and objectives, the state may to some extent support these 
functions when carried on by the church. At this point we may 
choose, simply for illustrative purposes, the operation of hospitals. 
32 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), 
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Clearly the operation of hospitals is a public function warranting 
the use of public funds. On the other hand, churches have tradi-
tionally operated hospitals as means of ministering to the sick and 
of expressing the concern and compassion of the church. Is it 
appropriate for government in any way to subsidize the operations 
of privately-owned and operated hospitals including hospitals 
owned and operated by the churches? The question is probably 
academic, because we know this has been done under the federal 
Hill-Burton Act33 whereby benefit of these funds to assist in the 
construction of new and additional hospital facilities has been ex-
tended to hospitals owned and operated by church groups. The 
theory here is that the government is supporting these hospitals 
obviously not because they are religious institutions but because 
they are performing a function which the state itself can perform.34 
IV 
We turn our attention now to the questions raised in respect 
to the relationship between the government and education and, 
more particularly, questions raised in respect to government and 
religious education. In general, it can be said that two underlying 
questions are presented by current developments and both of them 
have to do with the problem of establishment of religion by the 
state. The first is the question whether or not the state may in any 
way support any kind of program of religion in the public schools. 
The second is the question whether the state may give any form 
of assistance to the operation of what I have chosen to describe as 
parochial schools, which may be described by others as religious 
schools, or even by some as public-religious schools. 
The problem in respect to religious education or religious ex-
ercise in state-supported educational institutions presents distinctive 
aspects depending upon the level of education involved. Dealing 
with this problem first of all at the public school level, that is, the 
level of primary and secondary schools, is it appropriate, for in-
stance, to include as part of a public school program the reading of 
the Bible and even the recitation in unison of the Lord's Prayer? 
It can hardly be doubted that the introduction of a Bible reading 
and prayer exercise at the beginning of the school day is intended 
33 62 Stat. 1040 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 (a) - (n) (1958). 
34 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), where the Court upheld an appro-
priation of money by Congress to a hospital in the District of Columbia, even though 
the hospital was owned and operated by an incorporated sisterhood of the Roman Cath-
olic Church. 
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to have a religious significance, and it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that this does favor a particular religion, notably the 
Christian religion, and more particularly the Protestant religion, 
depending upon the version of the Bible that is used. As was men-
tioned at the beginning of this article, the public schools for many 
years in this country reflected a primary Protestant orientation and 
the practice of opening sessions with Bible readings and even reci-
tation of the Lord's Prayer reflects this Protestant influence. It is 
perhaps noteworthy that these practices frequently come under 
attack not from anti-religionists but from religionists such as Cath-
olics and Jews who contend that this is an attempt to use the public 
schools for purposes of inculcating Protestantism in the students. 
Historically the Bible-reading practice has been widespread, and if 
history is any index to the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, 
it would be difficult to deny the validity of this practice. I am 
inclined to think, however, that in view of the pronouncements by 
the Supreme Court in recent years on the meaning of the first 
amendment which is also read into the fourteenth amendment, it 
would be very difficult to support the validity of such practices at 
present. The circumstances under which these exercises are con-
ducted by a public school teacher, on school premises and as part 
of the regular school day, all point to the conclusion that the state 
through the use of its facilities, personnel and regular program is 
engaging directly in instruction and exercises that have a primary 
religious motivation and significance and which tend to favor one 
religious group.35 It must be kept in mind that a person who ob-
jects must have a substantial basis of standing to do so either by 
showing that he is a taxpayer and that tax funds are being used in 
an unlawful way-a very difficult thing to maintain here because 
of difficulty of showing out-of-pocket expenditure funds-or that 
his own liberty or that of his children is being infringed upon and 
in that case some actual coercive effect must be demonstrated.36 
The point should be observed also that the reading and study of 
35 In Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959), vacated and remanded 
for consideration of newly-enacted statute, 364 U.S. 298 (1960), the three-judge district 
court held unconstitutional daily Bible reading in the public school as required by a 
Pennsylvania statute as well as the practice of saying the Lord's Prayer in unison. 
The New York Court of Appeals has recently held constitutional the practice of open-
ing the public school day with the non-sectarian prayer recommended by the Board of 
Regents. Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579 (1961). 
36 See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), holding that a taxpayer as 
such did not have standing to challenge the validity of a statute requiring the reading 
of the Bible at the beginning of each school day. 
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the Bible as literature, or the study of religion, or instruction in 
moral values and ethics is not in itself objectionable so long as not 
identified with exercises and activities aimed at the cultivation of 
religious faith or motivation. Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
held that school boards may permit released time for religious in-
struction by teachers supplied by religious groups, provided this 
does not take place on the school premises.37 
By contrast we may point to the situation existing in many state 
universities where courses in religion are included as a part of the 
curriculum, either as courses included in particular departments 
or in a separate school of religion as at the State University of 
Iowa.38 Here very clearly is the use of public funds in a way to 
support an interest in religion and to support teaching in the field 
of religion. No one seems seriously to question the validity of this 
practice even though it does show that any sweeping assertions 
about the invalidity and use of money to support religious educa-
tion must be examined with a good deal of care and skepticism. The 
real reasons for distinguishing this situation from that of the public 
schools is that attendance at state universities is voluntary, that 
participation in these particular courses dealing with religion is 
voluntary, and that the greater maturity of the student precludes 
any notion that this is an attempt to indoctrinate or to compel 
students to accept a particular religious belief.39 This distinction 
between the two situations again points up a very important con-
clusion, namely, that the broad assertion made in the interpreta-
tion of the first amendment that no public funds can be used to 
aid religion in any way, or that it is even inappropriate for the 
state to show any kind of affirmative interest in the matter of reli-
gion or religious instruction is not supported by history or by 
present practice. 
The problems get more difficult when we get into the questions 
relating to the use of public funds in support of educational insti-
tutions owned and operated by churches, whether parochial schools 
operated at the primary and secondary level or colleges owned and 
operated by churches. In those cases the religious environment 
and religious objectives assume an integral significance in the total 
educational process. 
37 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
38 See McLEAN &: KIMBER, THE TEACHING OF RELIGION IN STATE UNIVERSITIES (1960) • 
39 See Kauper, Law and Public Opinion, in RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 69-86 
(Walter ed. 1958) • 
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Turning to the problem that is generating the greatest amount 
of current controversy, the question is raised whether in the event 
of federal aid to education it would be appropriate to assist private 
as well as public schools, including, in the private category, schools 
operated by churches and commonly known as parochial schools. 
It should be emphasized at this point that in the course of this 
whole discussion we are concerned wholly with limitations derived 
from the first amendment. Specific provisions of some state consti-
tutions limiting the use of public funds have a more restrictive 
effect on the power of state legislatures in spending money in aid 
of parochial schools than general limitations derived from the first 
amendment. 
The problem grows immediately out of the proposal that the 
federal government assist the states in the operation of the public 
school system by making grants to be administered through the 
states for the purpose of aiding the schools either in construction 
of new facilities or in meeting annual operating expenses.40 Essen-
tially the idea is that the federal government will tap its own finan-
cial resources in order to return to the states some of the money 
collected from federal taxpayers in order to help the states in oper-
ating their schools. The question that arises is whether or not the 
federal government should, as part of this program, give some 
financial assistance also to parochial schools. This is the immediate 
question. Interesting questions are raised also by the part of the 
President's program relating to colleges, including church-related 
colleges. 
The position of the administration as stated by President Ken-
nedy has been that constitutionally the federal government can 
give assistance only to public schools operated by the states, and 
that to aid parochial schools by any kind of federal financial assist-
ance would violate the first amendment as interpreted in the Ever-
son case.41 In opposition to this view has been the position asserted 
chiefly by the Catholic hierarchy, that while it may be constitution-
ally objectionable to use federal funds to support parochial schools 
in the same measure as public schools, it would not be unconstitu-
tional for the federal government to make loans at relatively low 
interest rates in order to assist parochial schools to meet their cap-
40 For the essential features and objectives of President Kennedy's program for use 
of federal funds in aid of education, see his Message to Congress, 107 CONG. REc. 2284 
(daily ed. Feb. 20, 1961). 
41. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 22; id. March 9, 1961, pp. 1, 16. 
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ital needs either by way of building new schools or extending or 
improving present facilities.42 
It should be evident from what has already been said that the 
constitutional question respecting federal aid for parochial schools 
does not admit of the easy or ready answer given by some who are 
opposed to such aid. 
Education is not a matter falling within the primary and direct 
jurisdiction of the federal government. At most, general educa-
tion, as distinguished from education for certain specific purposes,43 
comes within the reach of the federal government's authority by 
virtue of its power to spend for the general welfare.44 The theory 
in support of congressional spending for general education is that 
Congress may determine that this contribution to the more effec-
tive functioning of the nation's educational system by aiding the 
construction of more and better physical facilities and the payment 
of higher salaries to teachers will promote the nation's general 
welfare. 
If "general welfare" is the only consideration, no substantial 
difficulty is raised about the use of federal funds to aid parochial 
as well as public education, since attendance at these schools satis-
fies the compulsory school attendance laws of the several states and 
thereby serves the public purpose and objectives underlying these 
laws. 45 The constitutional issue that is raised is not whether this is 
spending for the general welfare but rather whether it is prohibited 
by the first amendment's non-establishment clause. Quite clearly, 
if either the federal government or the states were to provide 
money to aid Sunday School education or to provide transportation 
for children attending Sunday School, this would be the kind of 
support of religion prohibited by the non-establishment clause. 
The problem is quite different, however, when we talk about 
schools which are operated by churches but which parallel the pub-
lic school system. Two important considerations must be empha-
sized. First, compulsory school laws place a duty on parents to send 
42 See N.Y. Times, March 3, 1961, p. l; id., March 15, 1961, pp. 1, 26; id., March 30, 
1961, p. 16. 
43 Federal expenditures to aid training in science and mathematics find a specific justi-
fication in the power to promote the national defense. 
44 It is now recognized that Congress has an independent, substantive power to spend 
federal funds in order to promote "the general welfare." United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1 (1936); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
45 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) , holding that use of state tax funds 
to reimburse parents for the cost of sending children to parochial as well as public 
scllools was for a proper "public purpose." 
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their children to a school that meets the state's educational stand-
ards and requirements. The public interest in having all children 
receive minimum education-an objective that is vital and indis-
pensable to a democratic society-furnishes the justification for 
these compulsory education laws. Any schools, including parochial 
schools, that satisfy the state's requirements thereby serve the pub-
lic purpose underlying the compulsory education laws. Since a 
parent cannot receive credit for discharging his statutory obliga-
tion unless the school to which he sends his child meets the state's 
requirements by reference to secular courses that are taught, mini-
mum number of school days, health and safety standards, and qual-
ification of teachers, it is evident that private schools by meeting 
these requirements are already integrated in a substantial way into 
the total educational system within a state. 
Secondly, these schools outside the public school system but 
serving the same purpose under the compulsory school laws as the 
state-owned and operated schools, do not exist by sufferance or 
tolerance of the state. This is an important consideration. In the 
famous case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters46 the Supreme Court held 
that it is a constitutional right of parents to send children to the 
school of their choice, so long as the school meets requirements and 
standards that the state may properly impose, and that a state 
statute compelling parents to send their children to public schools 
is unconstitutional. By virtue of this decision churches have a 
right to operate schools and parents have a right to send their chil-
dren to parochial schools. The Court in sustaining these funda-
mental rights placed a constitutional barrier in the path of state 
monopoly of the educational process and of a state-directed pro-
gram of forcing all students into the mold of a uniform secular 
educational process. If parents wish to send their children to a 
school where religion assumes significance as a unifying element 
in the total educational program, this is their right. The public 
school is a cherished symbol of our democracy, but it may also be 
suggested that parochial and the non-parochial private schools, 
having their own important constitutional status and representing 
a basic freedom of choice on the part of parents, are an equally im-
portant and impressive symbol of our democratic and pluralistic 
culture. This is worth noting since it seems to the writer that so 
much of the opposition to aid for parochial schools stems from a 
46 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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feeling against these schools as though there were something almost 
un-American about them. 
The discussion here is not focused on the merits of the public 
schools versus parochial schools or on the policy considerations, pro 
and con, respecting use of public funds to aid parochial schools. 
We are concerned here with the constitutional aspects of any pro-
gram of federal aid to education that includes assistance for paro-
chial as well as public and non-parochial private schools. If the 
federal government were to make loans to churches to assist in the 
construction of new or additional school facilities, would this be 
the kind of "aid to religion" or support of religious education 
which according to the dictum of the Everson case is unconstitu-
tional as an attempt to establish religion? 
The Supreme Court has already sustained the use of public tax 
funds to transport children to parochial as well as public schools 
and this on the theory that this is not really aid to religious edu-
cation but social welfare legislation.47 It is apparent that the solu-
tion to some of these problems depends on placing the right label 
on the legislative program, and that if we can label a particular 
program as social or child welfare rather than aid to religious edu-
cation, we thereby determine the constitutional result. And even 
before the Everson case, the Court had held that the distribution 
of secular textbooks to children in parochial schools did not violate 
any constitutional limitations.48 This was even more direct aid 
to education conducted under the auspices of a church. But the 
distribution of these books served a valid secular purpose. Other 
instances of assistance that have not reached the courts may be 
cited, perhaps the most notable is the Free Lunch Program under 
the sponsorship of the federal government.49 Children are not 
denied the benefits of this because they are attending a parochial 
as distinguished from a public school. Here the theory is that this 
is a child-benefit program and that this is not direct assistance to 
religious education. The test propounded by some is whether the 
assistance is a direct subsidy to church bodies to aid them in the 
operation of their schools or whether it is a so-called fringe benefit 
that does not reach the heart of the educational process. Attention 
should also be called to the provisions of the National Defense 
Education Act of 195850 pursuant to which funds have been made 
47 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). 
48 Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
40 :,.;'ational School Lunch Act, 60 Stat. 230 (1946) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-60 (1958). 
uu 72 Stat. 1580 (1958), 20 U.S.C. §§ 441-45 (1958). 
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available by the federal government to colleges and high schools to 
assist in the acquisition of new equipment needed for the study of 
science, mathematics and foreign languages. Under the authority 
of this statute, federal funds have been loaned to parochial high 
schools.51 It is said, however, that neither bus transportation, dis-
tribution of secular textbooks, the free lunch program, or use of 
funds for laboratory equipment involve the state in support of a 
program of coerced religious instruction-a matter beyond the 
competence of the state to direct or support. The difficulty with 
this interpretation is that it leaves the critical question unanswered. 
At what point can it be said that financial assistance to parochial 
schools can be identified with religious instruction as to make it 
an unconstitutional establishment? There can be no precise an-
swer to this. If the relevant cases-those dealing with bus trans-
portation and textbooks-furnish any answer at all, it is that the 
state can afford some support for parochial schools in so far as they 
discharge the same secular functions as the public schools even 
though they have the plus element of religion. In other words the 
concurrence of function principle is applicable here. The paro-
chial schools do serve a recognized public purpose so far as the 
state's total interest in the educational process is concerned. 
By emphasizing the secular aspects of parochial school education, 
substantial financial assistance can be given without running into 
the obstacle that it amounts to an establishment of religion. If 
any distinguishing limitation is to be observed, it is that overall 
subsidies to parochial schools, which include support for operating 
expenses, are invalid because they further the teaching of religion, 
whereas assistance for specific purposes not directly and immedi-
ately identified with religious instruction is valid and proper.152 
In line with this theory a case may be made out to support the 
validity of a program of federal loans to assist in the construction 
of new parochial school facilities. Buildings, like buses and labora-
tory equipment, are neutral or can even be labeled secular.153 At 
51 The statute expressly authorizes low-interest loans to nonprofit private schools for 
these purposes. 72 Stat. 1588 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 445 (1958). 
52 The Vermont Supreme Court in a recent decision held that it was a violation of 
the first amendment's non-establishment clause for a school board to pay tuition charges 
for a student attending a Catholic high school outside the school district. The school 
district did not operate a high school, and its practice was to pay the tuition cost of its 
resident students who attended a high school in another district. Swart v. Smith Burl-
ington Town School Dist., 167 A.2d 514 (Vt.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961), 59 
MICH. L. REv. 1254 (1961). 
53 Particularly if federal grants were limited to the purpose of constructing facilities 
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least it appears to me that there is no controlling precedent that 
would require a conclusion that such use of federal funds would 
be unconstitutional. 
The opposition in some quarters to any assistance from federal 
funds for parochial school education is all the more striking in view 
of the apparent acquiescence in proposals for assistance to higher 
education that raise parallel questions. Thus, President Kennedy's 
proposed aid-to-education program calls not only for a continua-
tion of loans to colleges, including church colleges, for self-liqui-
dating projects such as dormitories, but also for a new program of 
outright grants to colleges, including church colleges, for academic 
buildings. It likewise calls for tuition scholarships for students 
going to private colleges and an additional grant of $300.00 to the 
institution itself on the theory that the cost of tuition is not com-
mensurate with the total cost of educating the student.54 A pro-
gram of loans to colleges on a long-term basis at cheap interest rates 
to help build dormitories, cafeterias and other buildings has been 
in effect now for several years55 but it has not excited any major 
constitutional arguments. Yet can it be questioned that the use of 
this government money at low interest rates is a financial aid to 
these colleges many of which are under the control of church 
bodies? Payment of the low interest rate as compared with bor-
rowing from other sources, frees operating expenses that may go 
into other phases of the college program, and if the President's 
further proposal is carried out, what about the validity of outright 
grants to colleges by the federal government for the purpose of 
constructing educational buildings? A similar problem is raised 
with respect to grants to church-related colleges to supplement 
tuition scholarships given to students who attend those colleges. 
Here are grants made directly to institutions to aid in their educa-
tional programs. Yet in many church-related colleges, religion is 
just as central a part of the educational program and objectives as 
it is in parochial schools. 
As previously noted, a distinction is observed in practice be-
tween religion in the public schools, on the one hand, and in state 
universities, on the other, and the position is taken that a parallel 
for such secular purposes as physical education, science, mathematics and foreign lan-
guages. 
54 See President's Message to the Congress, 107 CoNG. REc. 2284 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 
1961). 
rill Under authority of Title IV of the Housing Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 77, as amended, 
12 u.s.c. § 1749 (1958). 
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distinction can and should be made on the issue of spending fed-
eral funds to support church-related colleges as opposed to paro-
chial schools, and that consistent with the non-establishment re-
striction the federal government may aid private colleges, including 
church-related colleges, either by direct grants or loans or by 
benefit grants to students in a way not permitted with respect to 
parochial schools. In support of this position it is argued that 
private institutions play a much larger role in the total scheme of 
higher education as contrasted to the place of parochial schools in 
the overall system of primary and secondary education, that the 
state colleges and universities cannot take care of all the students 
who want a college education, that there is no compulsion to attend 
college, that the states do not provide tuition-free education at the 
higher level, that religion is a less conspicuous feature of church-
related colleges as contrasted to parochial schools, and that the 
college student's greater maturity limits the opportunity for sec-
tarian indoctrination.56 Whether or not these arguments are ade-
quately supported and whether or not they furnish a satisfactory 
and persuasive basis for distinction in respect to the constitutional 
issues raised respecting federal aid to parochial schools and to 
church-related colleges, respectively, at least it is clear that these 
distinctions rest wholly on practical, pragmatic and functional con-
siderations as a guide to interpretation of the first amendment 
limitation. 
In any event, it is clear that the government may give some 
support to parochial school education, either by way of so-called 
fringe benefits or by subsidizing particular phases of this education 
identifiable as secular in character. A principal reason to justify 
these expenditures is that parochial schools do serve a secular as 
well as religious purpose. To put the matter in another way, the 
church and state are engaged in concurrent functions. But we may 
also stress another reason, and this is that the state in giving some 
assistance to parochial schools is thereby making a meaningful con-
tribution in support of the right of parents to send children to the 
school of their choice. It may at a point become an empty gesture 
to talk about this right or about the correlative privilege of 
churches and other bodies or groups to operate schools, along 
with the public school system, if the cost to parents of maintaining 
56 See General Counsel's Memorandum, Dept. of Health, Education&: Welfare, Impact 
of the First Amendment to the Constitution Upon Federal Aid to Education, S. Doc. No. 
29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 24-26 (1961). 
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these private schools, in addition to the burden of supporting the 
public schools, is so great that as a practical matter is can no longer 
be borne. This is not to suggest that the government is under a 
constitutional duty to support private schools in whole or in part. 
This writer does not believe there is any such duty. But the con-
stitutional right of parents to send children to a school of their own 
choice, particularly when this choice is dictated by religious con-
siderations, is a substantial factor to be considered in any discus-
sion of the problem. There are situations where choices must be 
made between the policy underlying the free exercise of religion 
and the policy of non-establishment of religion. For Congress to 
decide that it will encourage the free exercise of religion by limited 
capital grants or loans to parochial schools at the expense of some 
aid to religion would not be an arbitrary choice, where in making 
this choice Congress also advances the general welfare served by 
the nation's total educational program and the secular objectives of 
the state's compulsory education laws. 
This writer is not advocating federal aid for parochial schools. 
But it is his opinion that consistent with the non-establishment 
principle of the first amendment and the separation limitation de-
rived from it, and in view of the interpretations given to this lan-
guage and the practices that have been sanctioned, Congress may 
grant some assistance to these schools as part of a program of spend-
ing for the general welfare, so long as the funds are so limited and 
their expenditure so directed as not to be a direct subsidy for 
religious teaching. 
It is clear that we cannot find answers to any of the questions 
in the field of church-state relations by employing broad and sweep-
ing postulates based on a theory of complete separation or on a 
theory that the state can do nothing which in fact aids religion_ 
These problems will have to be answered on a pragmatic basis that 
takes account of competing and conflicting interests and of the 
underlying purposes served by the separation principle. But it 
should also be stressed that the issue of constitutional power should 
not be confused with the question whether it is desirable or wise 
as a matter of policy for the government to give support to paro-
chial schools. Certainly any proposal for such support does invoke 
very important policy considerations. On the one hand, the effect 
of such assistance in promoting parochial schools and the resulting 
impact and effect on the public school system must be considered 
and weighed. And, in turn, those interested in the parochial 
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schools must seriously and carefully weigh the question whether 
and to what extent they should receive and accept assistance from 
the government at the expense of submission to controls that prop-
erly accompany grants of public funds. But these are questions of 
policy to be debated and argued in the public forum and in the 
legislative halls. Debate on these issues should not be foreclosed or 
obscured by indiscriminate invocation of the separation principle 
derived from the first amendment. 
